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This paper examines source and host country taxation towards
multínational enterprises that engage in product development. National tax
polícies are interdependent as they ínfluence the range of producta that the
multinational enterprise develops worldwide. The optimal tax policy of the
source country involves more or less than a full credit of foreign source
taxation towards domestic taxes. The hoat country is shown to capture more
tax revenues from the multinationals' host country operations than the
source country. For the case where private and public gooda ara perfect
substitutes, the source country optimally provide a tax credit and does not
capture any tax revenue from the multinational's host country operations.1
1. Introduction
Various authors have atressed the role of intangible or lnvisible
assets such as marketing, management and technology in the formation of
multínational enterprises.l However, the theory of the taxation of the
multinational has so far ignored the importance of taxation for the
multinational's investment !n intangibles. Instead, the previous theory
such as in Feldstein and Hartman [1979] has primarily viewed the
multinational es an agent of international capital mobility, and has focused
on the multinational's physical capital export and import decision. The
existing theory then ís an applicatlon of the theory of optimal taxes on
ínternational capital flows. Th1s paper examines the link between taxation
and the multinational's investment in reaearch and development of new
products, which is no doubt an important intangible. The paper ahows that
depending on the parameterization of the private sector's preferences the
source country should provide more or less than a full domestic tax credit
towards income taxes paid abroad. However, for the in-between caae where
private and public goods are perfect subsitutes we show the source country
optimally providea a tax credit and capturea no tax revenues from the
multinational's foreign operations, as ís approximately the case for the
United States at present.2
This paper builda on the statlc models of tzade in differentiated
products of Krugman [1979a], Dixit and Norman [1980J and Feenstra and Judd
[1982] and others. In particular, the model assumes the economy producea a
traditional good, and several varieties of manufactures in a monopolis-
tically competitive market setting. The production of manufactures
consists of an initial development stage, and a subsequent production stage.2
At the development stage, firms can create a new product at a fixed cost per
product. Once the initial development effort has been undertaken, the good
can be produced anywhere at constant marginal cost.
Consumers in all countries stand to benefit from the introduction of
additional manufactures, and thus product development takes on the
characteristics of an international public good. The number of varieties of
the manufactured good that will be produced depends on the multinationala'
ability to generate after-tax profits in each of the potential marketa, as
affected by tax policy. Thus natlonal tax policy towards multinational
enterpríses affects the development of manufactures worldwlde, even if
national tax authorities ignore the implications of national tax policy for
the introduction of new products abroad.
The paper focusea on the tax policies of a single source and a single
host country. Tax policy in either country represent a trade-off between
the objectives of raising national income by way of additíonal tax revanues,
and of providing multinationals with adequate incentives to develop new
manufactures. Generally the host country is shown to capture more tax
revenues associated with Che multinational's host country'a operations than
the source country. Underl~.ing this result is the institutional asymmetry
where the host country has a firat right to tax host country income, leavíng
the source country to tax income after host country taxes. However, the
souzce country stands to benefit from the foreign operationa of its
multinationals, even if it receives little or no direct tax beneflts from a
multinational's foreign operations, because multinationals that venture
abroad will invest more in product innovation to the benefit of domeatic
consumers.3
The remainder of this papez is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up
the model, and analyses the decisions of consumers and firms. Section 3
turns to the governments' taxatíon decísion and to international tax
interdependence. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. The model
The model describes national taxation policies towards multinational
enterprises that mazket their products ín each of Cwo countríes. The
existence of multinational firms that develop products in a source country
and subsequently manufacture these products in both the source and host
countries can be ratíonalized on the basis of the costs of licensing
information and of transportation.3 As our focus is on tax policy towards
the multinational enterpríae we will take the existence of the multinational
as given. Assuming a residence-based tax system, there is the institutional
asymmetry where the source country can tax the multlnational's source
country income and after-host-country-tax host country income, while the
host country can only tax the multinational enterprise's income generated
wíthin host country borders. Otherwise, the countríes are entirely
symmetric.
Labor, denoted L, is the only factor of production. It can ba used to
produce three categories of goods: a traditional good, called wheat and
denoted W, produced by a competitive agricultural sector; a pure public
good, P; and manufacures, M, produced by the multinational industrial
sector. Wheat and the public good are produced with constant returns to
scale production technologies, and units are chosen such that one unit of
labor is required to produce one unit of either wheat or the public good.4
The production of manufactures, whích exhibits increasing returns to scale,
requires an initial research and development effort undertaken in the
source country followed by production in either country. At the research
stage, a fixed resource cost r is incurred per variety of the manufacture.
At the production stage, units are agaln chosen such that one unit of labor
produces one unit of manufacture.
We now first characterize the consumer's choice problem and derive his
demand for wheat and manufactures. The derived goods demand functlons and
the tax environment together determine the firm's decision of inveatment
into research and development and the subsequent productíon decisions.
Section 3 of the paper turns to the two countries' taxation policies given
consumer and firm behavior. .
The consumer
Consumer income is equal to the inelastic labor supply L1 in country
i. As we will assume the manufacturing aector is characterized by
monopolístic competition, there will be no profits returned to consumers.
The representative consumer spends his wage income L so as to maximize the
following utility index
n
llíWs Mi,Mi, ,Mn,P1) - Wi-a~ E ~Mi~~~a~~ t~ pi j-1
i- s,h j- l,n 0 c a G 1, ~,ry ~ 0
(1)
where n is the number of uanufactures, subscripts refer to the source and
host countries, and superscripts to dífferent manufactures.
As is well known, the above utility specification gives rise to the
following demand relationships for wheat and each of the n manufaetures5
W1 - (1 - o)L1 , i - s,h (2)
L1
Mi - a np . i- s,h , j- 1,.. ,n (3)
where p is the price of any manufacture in terms of wheat.
The firm
Fírms are interested in maximizing worldwide after tax profits. This
implies they will introduce new produces to the point where at the margin
worldwide after-tax profits just cover the ínitial research and development
outlay of an additlonal variety of the manufacture. Let a~ and ah be the
pre-tax profits aseociated with product j aarned in the source and host
countries respectlvely. Also let ri be the tax levled by country 1(i -
s,h) on profits generated in country j(j - s,h). Thus r~ and re aze the
source country tax on source country income and the host country tax on host
country income respectively. r~ is the souce country táx applicable to
(after host country taxes) host country income. As Che host country can not
tax the multinational's income generated in the source country, we have rh -
0. With a monopoliatically competítive market structure, the number of
goods n is determined by the requirement that after-tax worldwide profita
per good are exactly equal to the cost of development.~ GLven the previous
notation this requirement can be written as
(1 - r~)s; t (1 - r;)(1 - rh)xó - r . j - 1,...,n (4)
where again a~~ and aA~ are the maximal pre-tax profits net of the reaearch
and development costs that the firm can achieve gíven that n varintiea are
produced and given the demand functions (3).6
Profits ~ are given by
si - Mi(p - c) ~ i- s,h , j- 1. .,n (5)
where p is the price of any manufacture in terms of wheat and c is the
cost of production. Given our technological assumptions, the cost of
production c is simply equal to 1 in terms of wheat.
Optimally the price p is set such that
P(1 - ó) - 1 (6)
where o- 1 1~ ís the elasticity of demand.s
Substituting for Ni and p from (3) and (6) into (5), we can now
write pre-tax profits ai as
aL1
xi - - na i - s,h , j - 1,.. ,n
Clearly, pre-tax profits per manufacture j decrease with the total
number of manufactures n on the market. Now we can substitute for x!~
from (7) into (4) and solve for the number of varieties n that will be
produced by the manufacturing sector. Solving for n yields
n- zo ~(1 - T;)L, t(1 - r;)(1 - fé)1-n] (8)
The above expression indícates that the number of manufactures n
increases with the ahare of income a apent on manufactures and with source
and host country disposable incomes L~ and Lh. It decreasea with the7
demand elasticity o, the development coat z and, not surprisingly, the
tax ratea f~ and fn.
3. National taxation oolicies and tax inter~eoen~or~P
In this section we turn to the determination of tax ratea in the source
and host countriea. As both countriea' tax rates affect the number of
varieties produced in the manufacturing sector, tax rates are
interdependent. For each of the two countrias, we first determine how
domestic taxation optimally depends on foreign taxation. Then we determine
how tax rates are set noncooperatively for a special case of the consumer's
utility specification.
Source countrv tax nolicv
The source country's government has to set the tax rates f~ and r~
applicable to the multinational's domeatic income and after-host-country-
taxes host country income respectively. It La probably reasonable to assume
that the domestic tax rate r~ is exogenous to host country taxation of
multinational enterprises and fixed at f~~.s The source country government
then is left to determine r~. Public revenue - and also the provision of
the public good in the source country - P~ is related to the tax rate r~ as
follows
P~ - r~~n~ t r~(1 - rs)ne (9)
Subsituting for e from (7), we see that P~ equals
aL~ aL~
P~(7~~ ó t f~(1 - fe) ój (10)
The government sets the tax rate r~ so as to maximlze the8
representative consumer's welfare. Formally, the source country government
maxímízea U(W~,M~,M~,...,M~, P~) given by (1) aubject to the private
sector's behavioral relationships (2), (3), (4) and (LO). Subsituting for
W~, M~ and P~ from (2), (3) and (10) into (1), we can write the
government's objective function as
a(o-1) a 1-a a~(o-1) alb ry
max ( o )(1-0) (n L~ t [r~(1 - rá)ój 1 (11)
fn
where use is made of the fact that p- a~(a-1).
The objective function clearly índicatea that - other things equal -
the consumer is better off the larger the number n of manufactures. We
will assume that 0 c a~(a-1) c 1 in (11), which is a necessary (but not
sufficient ) condition for an interior solutlon where the optimal tax rate
r~ is positive but less than one. After differentiating ( 11) with respect
to rh, we can write the source country's optimality condition as follows
(1-7)B
n - w~Ir;(1 - T~)~ C12)
where
oz'0-1' L B
w - [ (1 n)1 0 ! ~-y)
` alra-ry a - 1 r
1 - a
B - (1 - o t a)'
Note that B 1 1 in ( 12) as we have assumed that 0 c a~(o - 1) c 1 as a
necessary conditíon for an interior tax rate. The implications of the first
order condition (12) for the settíng of the tax rate r~ depend importantly9
on the substitutability parameter y. In particular, as y goes to
infinity (12) implies that r~ w111 optimally be set so as to keep the
product r~(1 - re) constant. Thua for ry very large, tax policy is set
so as to keep total tax revenuea and the provision of public goods constant
regardless of the host country tax rate rb.
Further, for the special case where ry- 1 equation (12) implies that
optimally r~ is set so as to keep the number of varietíes n constant.
From ( 8) we see that the constancy of n requires that the expression (1 -
r~)(1 - r~) is held fixed. Thus r~ ia optímally adjusted in rasponaes to
changes in re so as to keep the overall after-tax foreign source incoma of
the multinational fixed. This Ls equivalent to saying that the aource
country grants a tax credit to host country taxes.~ Note that the tax
credit arises endogenously after we assume the aource country sets íts tax
rate r~ - applicable to the aource country hoat country tax base -
optimally Ln response to host country tax changes. Thus the tax credit can
aríse as the optímal reaction to host country tax changes rathar than as a
rule that is given a priori.e
Host countrv tax oolicv
The host government facea the task of setting the tax rate rb. Host
country public revenue P~ is used to finance the proviaion of hoat country's
public good. Public revenue Pe is simply related to the host country tax
rate rh as follows
Pe -rénb (13)




- r~ - e a
(14)
The dístinction between (10) and (14) reflects the fact that the host
country can only tax the multínational's host country revenue, and that the
host country has as fírst right to tax host country revenue.
The objective of the host country's tax policy is to maximize that
country's representative consumer's welfare. Formally, the government
maxímizes U(41h,FIb,Mn.....M~,,Ph) given by (1) subject to the private
sector's behavioral equations (2), (3), (8) and (14). Subsituting for Wy,
I!h and Pb from (2), (3) and (14) into (1) we can write the government's
objective function as
a(o-1) a 1-a n~(o-1) aIb y




where again use is made of the fact that p - 0~(0-1).
After differentiating (15) with respect to rh, we can write tha source
country's optimality condition as follows
(1-7) B
n - 9~hI(1 - r;)rh 1
where
Qzra-7 1 - Q 1-a I~-7 g
Bh - wlrn-ry
(o - 1) l, ]
(16)
Again the way in which rh is optimally adjusted to changes in the
source country tax rate r~ depends critically on the parameter y. As 711
goes to infinity the optimally conditlon (16) implies that rh becomea a
constant which ís independent of r~. Thus for large values of ry the host
country will optimally make its public revenue and provísion of the public
good independent of source country taxatíon. It is further easy to check
that for any positive value of y n optimally decreases with r~ from the
host country's perspectíve, i.e. the host country wlll never reduce the tax
rate rh enough in response to a rise in rh so as to keep the number of
varieties n from going down. Thus the host country will never provide what
amouts to a full host country credít towards source country taxation.
Tax interdenendence
The number n implied by ( 12) and ( 16) has to be equal as a condition
for a noncooperative equllibrium in the tax zatea. Setting the right hand
sides of (12) and (16) equal, we see that if both countries had to rely on
taxing host country income (which would be the case if r~~ - 0) for any y
r~(1 - r~) c rh which implies that the host country always derives more tax
revenues from the multinational's host country operations than the aource
country. This inequality is a ímplication of the asymmetry of the
institutional set-up where the host country has a first ríght to tax host
country income. As a result of this asymmetry it is relatively expensive
for the host country in terms of foregone tax revenues to induce the
multinational to pzoduce additional varieties of tha good by way of a lower
host country tax rate.
As an illuatration we can take the case where fh - 1~3 and r~ - 1~2
so that P~ - Pb. Turning to (g), we see that for thís case the number of
goods n is more responsive to a change in r~ than to a change in rb~
In particular, (ón~ár~)~(án~árh) - 4~3. On the other hand, source countrylz
tax revenues and the provision of the public good are less responslve to r~
than host country tax revenue to rh. In partícular, (bP~~6r~)~(6P~~6rh) -
1~2. From the source country's perspective addltional product varieties are
thus less expensive in terms of foregone publíc goods than for the hoat
country. In particular, in thís example 6n~dP~ -(6~3)bn~6Ph. Thís
demonstrates that with equal tax revenues for the 2 countries the source
country hae a larger incentive to provide a tax incentive for additional
product innovation, and that thus the situation of equal tax ravenues can
thus not be an equilibrium.
In general the tax rate lnteraction depends in some complex way on the
parameters of the model and in particular on ry. In the ramainder of this
section, we wíll examine the tax competition between the two countriea for
the special case of ry- 1. While there is no presumption that in fact
7- 1 and that thus private and public goods are perfect subsitutes in the
utility specification (1), this special case is interestíng as the reaultíng
tax interaction appears to represent closely the tax interaction betwaen,
for instance, the United States and developing countries where U.S.
multinationals operate.
For the case where ry- 1, we have shown earlier that the source
country wishes to keep n constant, which from (8) implies the expression
(1 - r~)(1 - rá) is independent of r~ for interiot solutions of r~. Lat us
assume that if r~ - 0, then the equality (12) implies r~ - rá~ where
0 ~ r~' t 1. This implies that r~ - 0 and rh - rh~ ia a point on the
reaction curve that indicates the optimal aource country tax rata r~r for
any given host country tax rate r~. Algebraically, this reaction curve can




Thís relationship is represented by the curve labeled S in Figure 1.
Turning to the host country, ít is immediately clear from (12) and (16)
that for the specíal case of 7- 1 the optimal number of goods from the
host country's perspective is less than from the source country's
perspective for any positive source country tax rate r~. Noting (S), this
shows that for 0 G r~ 5 1 the host country reaction curve, labeled H in
Figure 1, lies to the right of the source country reaction curve, S.o
Equation (16) also implies that for some r~~ where 0 G r~~ G 1, lf r~~ s
r~ 5 1, then optimally rh - l.lo Finally, note that for r~ - 0
equations (12) and (16) are identical.
Using these facts, we can draw a host country reactíon curve, H, as
ín Figure 1. Note that the unique Nash equilibríum in the tax ratas r~
and rh is characterized by the intersection of the S and H curvea,
where we have r~ - 0 and 0 G rT G 1.11 Thís establishes that in
equilibrium the host country gets positive tax revenue from host country
íncome, while the source countty gets none.
The foregoing results accord well with the reality of the taxation of
U.S. multinationals. The United States índeed provides a tax credit to U.S.
multinationals' host country taxes on foreign source income rather than a
mere deduction which was found optímal ín Feldstein and Hartman [1979j.
Undez this system host countzies frequently find it in their Lnterest to
raise the host country tax rate at least to the level of the U.S, domestic
tax rate such that the U.S. treasury receíves no tax revanues at all from14
Figura 1. Tax reaction curves
host country tax15
the foreígn operations of U.S. multinationals. The multínationals' abllity
to spread overseas, however, is still Ln the source country's intereat ae
equation ( 8) indicates that as long as (1 - r~)(1 - rh)l,h ~ 0, then the
number of varieties produced will be larger in the case where the
multinational can spread abroad than othezwise. Thus the source country as
a whole benefits from the multinationals foreign operatíons as they yield
positive externalities to source country consumers, if not to the source
country treasury.
4. Concluding remarks
Thís paper explicitly recognizes that íntangible assets and in
particular research and development into new product varieties is influenced
by tax policies in any of the countries where they operate. Speclfic
parameterizations of the model can explain why it ís in the sourca country's
interest to provide its multinationals' with a tax credit towarda foreign
source income tax. Another reason for tax credits is of course that they
help to promote an efficient international allocation of resources, if
reciprocated, will benefits all countries involved. The efficiency
argument, however, does not explaín why the U.S. applies tha tax credlt
uníversally instead of reciprocally. An additional reason why foreign tax
credits remain is of course the political influence of the large
corporations that stand to lose most from its abolition.
One implication of the model, which was not atressed in the text, Ls
that the noncooperative tax equilibrium will be inefficient. In partícular,
countries will set their tax ratea such that thera will be an underprovisíon
of product varieties by the multinational enterprises. When countries aet16
their tax rates for the product innovating multinational they do not take
into account the externality of domestic tax policy to foreign conaumera and
thus they will generally set taxes too hígh and the multinationals will
engage ín too little innovation from a worldwide perspecitve.
A final issue concerna how the analysis would be altered if tax havens
were included in the model. Tax havens in principle can make a differance
as they enable a multínational to incorporate outside both the hoat and the
source countries, thereby avoiding any source country taxation of host
country income. However, for the caae where the model yields the result
that in equilibrium r~ - 0, it will do the multinational no good to
incorporate off-ahore. Tha inability of the U.S. to derive aubstantial tax
revenues from the multinationals' foreign operations under the present
regime may well explain why so many U.S. multinationals in fact remain
incorporated within the United States.17
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Endnotes
1. For a general discussion of the role of intangible assets in
multinational enterprise, see Caves [1982J. Models of the multlnational
enterprise based on this view and their implications for international
trade, are examined in Markusen (1984] and Helpman [1984].
2. For 1984 the tax liability before tax credits for U.S. corporationa was
5107.9 billíon on 5257.0 billion of worldwide income. s22.9 billion of
foreign tax credits and 521.2 billion of other tax credits reduced the
actual tax liability to 563.9 billlon. (See S~atistics on Income 19 4
Cor~oratíon Income Tax Returns, Table 16, p. 66).
3. The multinational could equally well produce only in the source country
and subsequently export to the foreígn country. However, in this case there
is some ambiguity as to where the multinational will locate its profits for
tax purposes as the multinational could transfer price its exports at eíther
production cost or final exort sales price. See Ethier [1986) and Horstmann
and Markusen [1987) for a discussion of licensing and the multinational
enterprise.
4. One can think of having n multinatíonal enterprisea that each produce one variety of the manufactured good. If n is lazge, thls will glve rise to a monopolistically competitive market structure.
S. More acurately, the elasticity o approaches 1~(1 -~) when the number of varieties goes to infinity. For a discussion, see Krugman and Helpman [1985].
6. Alternatively, one could assume that the two domestic tax ratea are set equal so that r~ - r~. The results shown below for the special case of
7- 1 goes through under this assumption.
7. For the value of r~~ such that r~~ -(1 - r~)(1 - rh) is conaiatent with
the quantity n that is optimal from the source country's perspective, there
is a tax credit where the domestic tax rate and composite tax on foreign
source íncome are equal.
8. Note that the tax credit arises endogenously after we aseume the source
country sets its tax rate r~ - applicable to the aource country host country
tax base - optimally in reaponse to hoat country tax changss. Thua the tax
credit arises as the optimal reaction to host country tax changea rathsr
than as a rule that is gíven a priori. Of course, the model does not allow
us to distinguish whether source country tax rates are set optímally given
that the tax system will exhibit a foreign source income tax credit, or
whether tax rates are set optimally in some general fashíon and then yield a
tax credit endogenously.
9. If r~~ - 0, then the host country reaction curve H lies to the right of
the source country reaction curve S for any point except the point r~ - 0
and rh - rh~. If instead r~~ ~ 0, then the curve H meets the rh~-axis to
the ríght of the point where the re~-axis..19
10. The reason is that for ~~ - 1 we see frou (8) that n is poaitiva,
while the right hand sida of ( 16) is equal to zero.
11. Note that in Figure 1, the S curve is shown for the case where ~~~
equals zero.Discussion Paper Series, CentER, Tilburg University, The Netherlands:
No. Author(s) Title
8801 Th. ven de Klundert Fiscal Policy and Finite Lives in Interde-
and F. van der Ploeg pendent Economies with Real and Nominal Wage
Rigidity
8802 J.R. Magnus and The Bias of Forecasts from a First-order
B. Pesaran Autoregression
8803 A.A. Weber The Credibility of Monetary Policies, Policy-
makers' Reputation and the EMS-Hypotheais:
Empirical Evidence from 13 Countries
8804 F. van der Ploeg and Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of Competitive
A.J. de Zeeuw Arms Accumulation
8805 M.F.J. Steel Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equation
Systems under Diffuse Stochastic Prior
Information: A Recursive Analytical Approach
8806 Th. Ten Raa snd Secondary Products and the Measurement of
E.N. Wolff Productivity Growth
8807 F. van der Ploeg Monetary and Fiacal Polícy in Interdependent
Economies with Capital Accumulation, Death
and Population Growth
8901 Th. Ten Ras and The Choice of Model in the Construction of
P. Kop Jansen Input-Output Coefficients Matrices
8902 Th. Nijman and F. Palm Generalized Least Squares Estimation of
Linear Models Containing Rational Future
Expectations
8903 A. ven Soest, Labour Supply, Income Taxes and Hours
I. Woittiez, A. Kapteyn Restrictions in The Netherlands
89G4 F. van der Ploeg Capital Accumulation, Inflation and Long-
Run Conflict in International Objectives
8905 Th. van de Klundert and Unemployment Persiatence and Loss of
A. van Schaik Productive Capacity: A Keynesian Approach
8906 A.J. Markink and Dynemic Polícy Simulation of Linear Models
F. van der Ploeg with Rational Expectations of Future Events:
A Computer Package
8907 J. Osiewalski Posterior Denaitiea for Nonlinear Regression
with Equicorrelated Errors
8908 M.F.J. Steel A Bayesian Analysis of Simultaneous Equation
Models by Combining Recursive Analytical and
Numerical ApproachesNo. Author(s)
8909 F. van der Ploeg
8910 R. Gradus and
A, de Zeeuw
8911 A.P. Barten
8912 K. Kamiya and
A.J.J. Talman
8913 G. van der Lsan and
A.J.J. Talman
8914 J. Osiewalski and
M.F.J. Steel
8915 R.P. Gilles, P.H. Ruys
and J. Shou
8916 A. Kapteyn, P. Kooreman
and A. van Scest
891~ F. Canova
8918 F. van der Ploeg
8919 w. Bossert and
F. Stehling
8920 F. van der Ploeg
8921 D. Canning
8922 C. Fershtman and
A. Fishman
8923 M.B. Canzoneri and
C.A. Rogers
8924 F. Groot, C. Withagen
and A. de Zeeuw
8925 O.P. Attanasio and
G. Weber
Title
Two Essays on Political Economy
(i) The Political Economy of Overvaluation
(ii) Election Outcomes and the Stockmarket
Corporate Tax Rate Policy end Public
and Private Employment
Allais Characterisation of Preference
Structures and the Structure of Demand
Simplicial Algorithm to Find Zero Points
of a Function with Special Structure on s
Simplotope
Price Rigidities and Rationing
A Bayesian Analysis of Exogeneity in Models
Pooling Time-Series and Croas-Section Data
On the Existence of Networks in Relational
Models
Quantity Rationing and Concavity in a
Flexible Household Labor Supply Model
Seasonalities in Foreign Exchange Markets
Monetary Disinflation, Fiscal Expansion and
the Current Account in an Interdependent
World
On the Uniqueness of Cardinally Interpreted
Utility Functions
Monetary Interdependence under Alternative
Exchange-Rate Regimes
Bottlenecks and Persistent Unemployment:
Why Do Booms End?
Price Cycles and Booms: Dynemic Search
Equilibrium
Is the European Community an Optimal Currency
Area? Optimal Tax Smoothing versus the Cost
of Multiple Currencies
Theory of Natural Exhauatible Reaources:
The Cartel-Versus-Fringe Model Reconsidered
Consumption, Productivity Growth and the
Interest RateNo. Author(s) Title
8926 N. Rankin
8927 Th. van de Klundert
8928 C. Dang
8929 M.F.J. Steel and
J.F. Richard
Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a'Hartian'
Model of Imperfect Competition
Reducing External Debt in a World with
Imperfect Asset and Imperfect Commodity
Substitution
The D1-Triengulatíon of Rn for Simpliciel
Algorithms for Computing Solutions of
Nonlinear Equations
Bayesian Multivariate Exogeneity Analysis:
An Application to a UK Money Demend Equation
893o F. van der Ploeg Fiscal Aspects of Monetary Integration in
Europe
8931 H.A. Keuzenkamp The Prehistory of Rational Expectations
893z E. van Damme, R. Selten Alternating Bid Bargaining with a Smallest
and E. Winter Money Unit
8933 H. Carlsson and plobal Payoff Uncertainty and Riak Dominance
E. van Demme
8934 H. Huízinga National Tax Policies towarda Product-
Innovating Multinational EnterpriaesP.O. BOX 90153 5nnn I F TII RI IRf~ T4-IF NFTI-I
Bibliotheek K. U. Brabant
01~I11111111~~1~~111111